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The Strategic Effects of South 
Asian Nuclear Proliferation 
Gregory Paul Domin 
Mercer University 
This essa y analyzes the factors underlying nuclear ten-
s ions in South Asia and how governments and organiza-
tions working toward nonproliferation and arms control 
are prepared-or not prepared-to deal with this problem 
in the post-Cold War era . The essay then examines the 
different methods to disarmament, nuclear ownership , 
and bargaining in India and Pakistan , two states that are 
only beginning to learn the utility of arms control in 
ma intaining nuclear stability in South Asia . The essay 
concludes by making several recommendations that can 
be met only by concurrent efforts among a variety of 
parties . Although the highest responsibility remains 
those of the governments in the region , attention and ac-
ti on from parties outside of the region are also needed to 
benefit nonproliferation efforts in South Asia, as well as 
maintaining nuclear stability in the area . 
INTRODUCTION 
The May 1998 nuclear tests by both India and Pakistan, accompanied by the expressed intentions of both nations to become full-fledged nuclear weapon states, present the 
prospect of a new nuclear arms race in South Asia. Perhaps even 
more ominous is the potential for these events to promote degra-
dation of security relations and proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction beyond the region. This viewpoint addresses the fu-
ture of nuclear nonproliferation from the broader prospects of the 
new circumstances in the region. 
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If the international community is unwilling to take a 
clear, affirmative decision to abandon reliance on nuclear weap-
ons, the number of states possessing nuclear weapons will 
probably increase in the next decade or so. Stopping the prolif-
eration of nuclear weapons, even to non-state actors such as ter-
rorists groups, will be harder. The window of opportunity for 
reducing the likelihood of these scenarios is closing. 
This essay examines India 's decision to test a nuclear 
explosive as well as Pakistan 's response and the global conse-
quences of such actions. It then examines the important links 
between the South Asian nuclear tests and proliferation problems 
more generally. The reasons for India 's and Pakistan 's decisions 
to test nuclear weapons are numerous. This viewpoint focuses on 
the links between the tests and the circumstances elsewhere in 
the region to draw attention to the expanding number of rein-
forcing relationships among proliferation aspirants. In particular , 
an explanation of these links reveals that the South Asian nuclear 
tests were more a symptom than a cause of the now visibly 
weakening Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). These links also 
show that the task of curbing the spread of weapons of mass de-
struction has become more complicated, demanding new strate-
gies on the parts of those governments and organizations work-
ing to achieve nonproliferation goals. 
The essay then examines existing Indian and Pakistani 
efforts to manage the nuclear competition in South Asia. It ar-
gues that a durable nuclear peace in South Asia rests on the abil-
ity of these adversaries to overcome a formidable array of politi-
cal, psychological, and bureaucratic obstacles to establishing an 
effective nonproliferation regime in this region . 
The essay concludes by arguing that these efforts at non-
proliferation in South Asia can only be achieved by the concur-
rent efforts among a variety of players. Although the highest re-
sponsibilities remain among those of the governments in the re-
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gion, attention and action from parties outside the region are also 
needed-most particularly from the United States, but also from 
other governments and non-governmental organizations. The 
current dilemmas in South Asia can be resolved only through 
strategies of comprehensive engagement on the parts of both 
governments and non-governmental organizations. Although the 
nuclear tests of the past year seems to have derailed efforts of 
nonproliferation in the region, concerted action offers reasonable 
hope of placing nonproliferation efforts on a course consistent 
with global peace and security in the twenty-first century. 
INDIA'S DECISION TO TEST 
It is clear that the Bharatiya Party authorized a series of 
tests for which there was no compelling strategic necessity. The 
party came into office determined to carry out the tests. It did not 
consult the Parliament nor conduct a promised strategic defense 
review before reversing the national consensus . The Hindu-right 
in India has advocated nuclearization since 1951, thirteen years 
before China acquired nuclear weapons. Now, the "sacred cow" 
of national security has been invoked to mask the ideological and 
electoral interests of the ruling coalition and the vested interests 
of India's nuclear and defense civilian-scientific sector. 
Authorization of the tests and the proclamation of India's 
status, although inter-related, must be distinguished for purposes 
of analysis . On the one hand, the timing of the Indian tests were 
determined by the electoral compulsions of a politically shaky 
coalition in India. The timing was also influenced by arguments 
from India's "bomb lobby," which feared that a growing interna-
tional norm against horizontal proliferation might forever fore-
close India's option to test. On the other hand, India's decision to 
declare itself a nuclear weapon state has more to do with the 
Hindu-right's ideological motivations and the changing self-
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perceptions oflndia 's strategic elite, in their search for a separate 
Indian national identity. 
In their quest for modernization, India 's state and politi-
cal managers have faithfully reproduced Western norms and 
culture in the area of national security. In doing so, they have 
come to regard a nuclear deterrent as the ultimate measure of 
national power and a symbol of modernity, scientific excellence, 
and a higher strategic culture . Nuclear weapons, they hope, will 
bolster India 's prestige and consolidate its profile as an emerging 
great power in the international system. 
At the core of India's decision, therefore, is the sociali-
zation of its ruling elite into a cultural belief that nuclear weap-
ons and status constitute legitimate means to enhance the do-
mestic prestige of the state and expand its power in the interna-
tional system. Ironically, such beliefs are themselves the expres-
sion of a colonized mindset that lacks self-esteem and a nation-
state that suffers from a historical inferiority complex . 
In many respects, however, India has been right that the 
non-weapon states that are parties to the NPT have used the 
treaty to perpetuate a double standard. Indian Prime Minister 
Atal Behari Vajpayee had a point when he observed, at the fifti-
eth anniversary of his country's Atomic Energy Commission in 
November 1998, that "a few nations are sitting on huge stock-
piles of nuclear weapons," and concluded that their policy of 
"insisting on collective restraint on the part of the rest of the 
world is an inherently unstable proposition" (Reuters 1998, A2). 
The belief that the nuclear weapon states are committed to an 
indefinite monopoly of these weapons in order to enhance their 
prestige and power at the expense of other states contributed to 
the Indian decision to resume testing. Now both India and Paki-
stan have added themselves to the number of states claiming to 
seek a nuclear-weapon-free world of retaining nuclear arsenals. 
The addition of the world's sixth and seventh declared nuclear 
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arsenals has exacerbated pressure for proliferation. This is not 
only because more states now openly contend that nuclear weap-
ons are vital to them, but also because the addition of two more 
states with nuclear weapons threatens the integrity of the NPT 
regime, however imperfectly, to accommodate only five nuclear 
weapons states. 
Although both the 1974 and 1998 Indian nuclear explo-
sive tests were conducted primarily for domestic political rea-
sons, the Indian Government explained both with language taken 
from the NPT. In 1974, then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi care-
fully emphasized that India's first nuclear test was a "peaceful 
nuclear explosion" permitted under Article V of the NPT 
(Thaker 1999, 14). Similarly, when Prime Minister Vajpayee de-
clared, following the May 1998 tests, "that India is a nuclear 
weapon state," his use of treaty terminology affirmed the cen-
trality of the NPT to the existing international security environ-
ment as surely as his country's action undermined the regime. 
Contrary to Prime Minister Vajpayee's assertion, India 
can never be a nuclear weapon state. "Nuclear weapon state" is 
defined in Article IX of the NPT as a state having detonated a 
nuclear explosive before 1967 (Albright 1998, 21). Prime Min-
ister Vajpayee's claim to this legal term is an anachronism, as is 
the notion that India has attained some sort of "nuclear status" by 
exploding nuclear weapons. The age of the "nuclear club" is at 
the end. Any distinction India thinks it has achieved in crashing 
the gate will be washed away if its actions help usher in an age 
of "nuclear rabble," where many states and some sub-state actors 
have nuclear weapons. 
The NPT regime is the international community's best 
tool for limiting nuclear proliferation and moving toward nuclear 
disarmament. The regime, however, is far from perfect, and 
frankly, is capable of doing more. For example, the nuclear 
weapon states should do much more to live up to their Article VI 
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disarmament obligations, such as negotiating deeper cuts in nu-
clear arsenals and agreeing not to use nuclear weapons first. 
Such actions would help discredit the assertion that the NPT is 
discriminatory . India itself has railed against this perceived ine-
quality for twenty-eight years, but its recent decision to surrender 
the moral high ground by declaring itself a nuclear weapon state 
threatens the NPT regime and its goal of eventual nuclear disar-
mament. 
PAKISTAN'S RESPONSE 
After India 's nuclear tests in May 1998, the world held 
its collective breath . When Pakistan conducted its own nuclear 
tests, Prime Minister Vajpayee claimed "we are now vindicated," 
as if a Pakistani wrong could right an Indian wrong (Ali 1999, 
14). India was not vindicated but rather confirmed in a destruc-
tive path. On 28 May 1998, the idea of a nuclear proliferation 
chain in South Asia stopped being a speculation and became a 
sad reality. The other shoe dropped, but it is now frighteningly 
clear that the "other shoe" may not be the last. We have seen a 
clear demonstration that nuclear proliferation is self-
perpetuating ; and the fact that these new potential nuclear com-
batants stand, as Secretary of State Madeleine Albright has ob-
served, "cheek by jowl...creates a uniquely dangerous situation" 
(Diamond 1998, 2). 
Although India has denied parity between itself and 
Pakistan, strategic nuclear parity is the result that proliferation in 
both states has produced . India is much larger and, in economic 
and conventional military terms, much stronger than Pakistan. 
However, with nuclear weapons on both sides, India 's enormous 
military advantage is somewhat neutralized, as then US Ambas-
sador to India Patrick Moynihan expressed to Prime Minister 
Indira Gandhi following India 's "peaceful nuclear explosion" in 
1974: 
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India has made a huge mistake. Here you were the 
number one hegemonic power in South Asia . Nobody 
was number two and call Pakistan number three. 
Now in a decade's time, some Pakistani general will 
call you up and say I have four nuclear weapons and I 
want Kashmir. If not, we will drop them on you and 
we will all meet in heaven. And then what do you 
do? (Kux 1993, 305). 
The fundamental effect of the other shoe dropping is that 
South Asia has just moved closer to the edge of a regional nu-
clear war that could claim the lives of millions. As Iranian For-
eign Minister Kharazzi told the Conference on Disarmament in 
June 1998, "The nuclear sword of Damocles is now hanging 
over the region by a thread" (Whittle 1998, Al). 
The open acquisition of nuclear weapons has made the 
use of nuclear weapons more likely than at any time since the 
beginning of the Cold War, with the possible exception of the 
Cuban Missile Crisis. The peaceful resolution of the Cuban Mis-
sile Crisis had as much to do with luck as with stable deterrence. 
The world can ill afford another Cuban Missile Crisis, this time 
in Kashmir . The fortuitous outcome of the crisis and the absence 
of nuclear war since then represents a chance at peace that hu-
mankind should be bound by its survival instinct to grasp. If 
every nation risks rolling the nuclear dice, eventually, those dice 
will turn up snake eyes and we will all lose. 
GLOBAL CONSEQUENCES 
The immediate implications of nuclear proliferation in 
South Asia extend beyond the subcontinent. For instance, it is 
possible that some predominantly Muslim states could view a 
Pakistani nuclear arsenal as a deterrent to the possibility of Israel 
even using a weapon of mass destruction against them. In this 
context, Israel could come to believe that a Pakistani nuclear ar-
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senal threatens Israeli defense programs or installations. Conse-
quently, it is conceivable that Pakistani acquisition of nuclear 
weapons could further destabilize already strained relationships 
among groups of different faiths. On his arrival in Islamabad on 
June 1, Iranian Foreign Minister Kharrazi announced that "from 
all over the world, Muslims are happy that Pakistan has this ca-
pability" (Diamond 1998). Days later in Saudi Arabia, Pakistani 
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif assured the world that "nuclear 
weapons have no religion" (Anderson 1998). However, inten-
tions do not always equate with outcome: history is replete with 
examples of religious zeal igniting conflict when reason would 
have dictated caution. 
Beyond the short-term strategic instability South Asian 
nuclear arsenals may generate, nuclear proliferation on the sub-
continent threatens to destroy the NPT regime on which the rest 
of the world bases its security. When its parties again review the 
NPT in 2000-the first Review Conference incorporating the 
enhanced review process agreed upon in 1995-its performance 
in preventing proliferation and encouraging disarmament will be 
assessed critically. If the South Asia nuclear tests result in forc-
ing open the door to the "nuclear club" and India, a longtime 
declaratory proponent of nuclear disarmament, joins the ranks of 
those states that rely on the threat of using nuclear weapons for 
their security, the continued viability of the NPT will be in seri-
ous question. If state parties to the NPT see the world moving in 
the direction of declaratory reliance on nuclear weapons for se-
curity, they will be pressured to adopt a policy of such reliance 
themselves and be more reluctant to rely on the NPT regime . 
An even greater threat lurks behind the possible dissolu-
tion of the NPT regime. Its collapse could trigger the emergence 
of a "nuclear rabble," increasing the threat of nuclear terrorism . 
There is no reason to believe that India and Pakistan will be im-
mune from the protection, control, and accountability problems 
THE JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 
SOUTH ASIAN NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION 53 
that have faced other states with nuclear arsenals. Even if other 
states do not follow India and Pakistan's example, more weapons 
and weapon-usable material, stored in more locations , and acces-
sible to more individuals , increase the likelihood that nuclear 
weapons will be used accidentally or without authorization , or 
that weapons or materials will be diverted or stolen . While a 
number of states currently possess weapon-usable nuclear mate-
rial, further acquisition of nuclear weapons by India, Pakistan , 
and possibly other states can only exacerbate this problem. 
In the early 1960s, some predicated that there would be 
20 or 30 nuclear weapon states by the end of the 1970s. Fortu-
nately, the international community saw the dangers of nuclear 
proliferation and chose to work toward only the viable alterna-
tive, a world ultimately free of nuclear weapons, by negotiating 
the NPT. The NPT has served as the principal bulwark against 
widespread nuclear proliferation , and no state declared a new 
nuclear weapon capability during the first twenty-eight years of 
its operation. However, India's recent actions, coupled with in-
action by nuclear weapon states (NWS), have placed this essen-
tial tool in acute danger. If the NPT begins to unravel or even 
collapses, the most terrifying predictions of the past may not be 
bad enough to describe the future. If nonproliferation is to be 
possible, it must be chosen and pursued concurrently . 
PROLIFERATION LINKAGES IN SOUTH ASIA AND BEYOND 
Although India 's five nuclear tests on May 3 and 5 were 
widely criticized, they met with rather tepid reactions from the 
world community (Disarmament Diplomacy 1998, 51) that were 
certainly insufficient to stave off Pakistan's "retaliatory" nuclear 
tests. With both countries accelerating development of sophisti-
cated medium-range ballistic missiles and with nuclear 
"weaponization" perhaps already underway, the tests and policy 
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declarations of both countries have raised the specter of a spi-
raling nuclear arms race in the region. 
Two sets of issues raise questions as to whether a nuclear 
standoff between India and Pakistan would be as stable or en-
during as that between the US and the Soviet Union proved to 
be: first, these countries ' history of war and crisis, coupled with 
their contemporary grievances, despite a period of recent 
"warmed " relations , suggest a relatively greater prospect for fu-
ture conflicts in which deliberate nuclear attack might be con-
templated. Neither country is a "status quo" state for which de-
terring attack is a sufficient end. The ardent cultural and religious 
dimensions of this relationship are a particular source of uncer-
tainty. Though both countries share important bonds and in past 
wars have shown some propensity to restrain the use of force, 
there remains clear prospects that crises could release deep ani-
mosities that overwhelm the kind of sober rationality assumed by 
theories of mutual deterrence. 
Second, the countries ' territorial proximity is a crucial 
new variable. The US and the Soviet Union, at a similarly early 
stage in their nuclear rivalry, could deliver nuclear weapons only 
by aircraft and therefore had hours of warning time of an attack. 
By the time of deployment of ballistic missiles reduced this mar-
gin to ranges of O to 30 minutes, the Cold War rivals had ac-
quired many years of experience with their nuclear relationship 
that thereby helped maintain stability. In contrast, India and 
Pakistan could traverse from latent nuclear ability to overt nu-
clear rivalry by deploying nuclear-armed ballistic missiles with 
flight times as short as three minutes. This possibility dramati-
cally limits reaction times in crisis decision making and hence 
prospectively increases the danger of an inadvertent nuclear 
war. 
1For an argument that this circumstance would create strong temptations for pre-emptive 
and "launch-on-warning" strategies, placing tremendous time-critical pressures on deci-
sion makers and command and control systems with past histories of incoherence and no 
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However, a more worrisome-and far less studied-im-
plication of the prospects of a nuclear arms race between India 
and Pakistan is its potential cause to spiraling repercussions out-
side of South Asia. Many states in Asia and elsewhere in the 
world will be watching the progress of events with keen interest, 
and this progression is likely to have effects in other regions that 
will be difficult to anticipate. 
The potential importance of such links between circum-
stances in South Asia and elsewhere is evinced in part by the role 
such links played in leading up to the South Asian nuclear tests 
themselves. Thus far, most attention has focused on those factors 
indigenous to the region, including the Indian-Pakistani relation-
ship, Indian and Pakistani domestics policies, and Indian and 
Pakistani perceptions of external actors (such as China, the US, 
and the nonproliferation regime). Less attention, however, has 
been focused on the links between proliferation developments in 
South Asia and the roles played by actors and concurrent devel-
opments elsewhere in Asia and the world, particularly in con-
tributing to India's and Pakistan's nuclear missile development 
programs. 
For example, assertions that China provided Pakistan 
with assistance in its nuclear weapon and ballistic missile devel-
opment are well known. Pakistan reportedly has obtained from 
China crucial technology to support its nuclear program as well 
as complete M-11 nuclear-capable missiles. More recently, 
China is believed to have supplied plans and equipment to enable 
Pakistan to construct a factory for indigenous production of the 
missile. With a range of only about 300 kilometers, however, 
these missiles do not enable Pakistan to strike major Indian cities 
(Sheppard 1998; Bermudez 1998). 
experience in explicit nuclear contexts, see Ben Sheppard, "Too Close for Comfort : Bal-
listic Ambitions in South Asia," Jane ·s Defence Weekly. 19 May 1998. 
VOL. 28 2000 
56 [X)MJN 
India, for its part, has used Canadian-made nuclear re-
actors to produce plutonium for its weapons program and ac-
quired technological information for its missile development 
program from both Russia and the US. India developed its re-
cently tested Agni missile, with an estimated range of 2,000 
kilometers, in part using technology originally purchased from 
the US (Smith 1998, 8). 
In addition, few have noted the ways in which North Ko-
rea's role in facilitating the missile proliferation in South Asia 
helped set the scene for the current crisis.2 India's nuclear tests 
came just five weeks after Pakistan successfully test-fired its 
new Ghauri missile . This nuclear-capable missile, with an esti-
mated range of up to 1,500 kilometers and an estimated payload 
capacity of up to 700 kilograms, provides Pakistan with a poten-
tial nuclear threat against most major Indian cities. It is now 
known that the Ghauri was developed from North Korean No-
dong missiles, sold in complete form to Pakistan in 1997 ( even 
though they have yet to be provided to North Korea's own mili-
tary) (Bermudez 1998, 27). 
Through its direct contribution to accelerating the mis-
sile technology race in South Asia, North Korea 's actions helped 
create the context within which India made its decision to con-
duct nuclear tests. Admittedly, the Ghauri test was at most a pre-
cipitating factor in the decision by India's ruling Bharatiya Party 
to conduct the nuclear tests-a move that had been contemplated 
by other Indian governments for many years. However, India's 
deep-seated anxiety about its strategic position vis-a-vis China 
has long been a central rationale for India's nuclear program. 
Moreover, India has interpreted Chinese assistance to Pakistan as 
a crucial indication of China's strategic concern. In this envi-
2This missile sale advanced a North Korean-Pakistan relationship dating back to the 
i 970s and firmly established in the 1980s, when the two countries cooperated in provid-
ing military assistance to Iran in its eight year war with Iraq . 
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ronment, the role played by North Korea's history of assistance 
to Pakistan's missile development should not be discounted. 
North Korean missile assistance to Pakistan, combined 
with its own missile development activities, also represent an 
important failure of the broader diplomatic effort by the US to 
integrate North Korea into the world community and restrain its 
"rogue" behavior. Despite the significant effort that the US has 
invested in seeking to curb its missile technology proliferation, 
meetings between the two countries on this issue have been 
characterized mostly by a lack of progress and frequent break-
downs . Meanwhile, North Korea managed to conduct its sale of 
missiles to Pakistan without obstruction.3 In the wake of the nu-
clear tests, North Korea, ignoring heightened attention to this 
relationship, reportedly delivered to Pakistan several shipments 
of weapons materials that included warhead canisters for the 
Ghauri missile. These shipments reportedly took place amid in-
dications that Pakistan is proceeding with production of the mis-
sile and development of nuclear warheads that can be carried by 
it (Weiner 1998, A3). 
US, Chinese, and North Korean missile assistance to In-
dia and Pakistan epitomizes the emergence of a set of mutually 
reinforcing linkages among proliferation prospects-a prolifera-
tion network. This network introduces a new and troubling di-
mension to the problem of achieving arms control and prevent-
ing proliferation in the region and worldwide. This network is 
still in a nascent stage, consisting of only a confluence of rela-
tionships rather than a mechanism of direct coordination. Nev-
ertheless, even at this level, the emerging network of links posi-
3Foreshadowing the now renowned US failure to anticipate India's first nuclear tests, US 
offic ials have acknowledged that the US was unaware of the Ghauri transaction until it 
was completed . See David Smith, "A Feared Scenario Around the Comer''; and Tim 
Weiner, "US Says North Korea Helped Develop Pakistani Missile," The New York Times, 
l lApril 1998, A3. 
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tively reinforces incentives for proliferation across disparate 
situations. Thus, more than ever, decisions and events in a given 
situation and region are likely to have unexpected and unin-
tended implications in other places at other times. 
The link between circumstances of South Asia and the 
Korean Peninsula exemplifies this point. Concurrent to, but 
overshadowed by, the South Asian nuclear tests, North Korea 
threatened to effectively "suspend" its 1994 "Agreed Frame-
work" accord with the US under which it forsook its own incipi-
ent nuclear weapons program (Bermudez 1998). The US gov-
ernment immediately questioned North Korea's intention and/or 
capacity to follow through on the specific threats to "reopen" the 
reactors addressed under the Agreed Framework (Bermudez 
1998). However, more recent events have suggested that concern 
over the North Korean nuclear program is still warranted (Ber-
mudez 1998). The threats have (or at least should have) served to 
highlight a growing North Korean dissatisfaction with the rate of 
progress in achieving the ends of the Agreed Framework and 
improving its relations with the US (Bermudez 1998). This dis-
content has likely contributed to the failure of US diplomacy to 
achieve North Korean missile proliferation restraint. This prolif-
eration, in turn, then became a contributing factor in South Asian 
instability and ultimately the nuclear tests. 
Now, the South Asian tests may not only spark a nuclear 
arms race in that region, but may also increase insecurity 
throughout Asia . In a potential "feedback," events in South Asia 
indirectly encouraged, if not provided direct incentives for, North 
Korea's most recent actions-especially the August 31 missile 
test. 4 More broadly, the changes circumstances in South Asia 
"Many analysts have noted the apparently poor timing of the missile test, which aborted 
Japan's pending approval of funding for the Korean Peninsula Energy Development 
Organization (KEDO) and disrupted a promising round of talks with the US. Two of the 
most prominent explanations for the North Korean action are that it was intended to 
THE JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 
SOUTH ASIAN NUCLEAR PROLJFERA TION 59 
have raised questions concerning the sustainability of the NPT 
and may serve to obstruct ratification of the Comprehensive Test 
Ban Treaty in the US Congress and START II in the Russian 
Duma (Isaccs 1998, 40). These cascading consequences threaten 
to erode the institutions, norms, and political cooperation sup-
porting nuclear arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation 
worldwide. 
NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL IN SOUTH ASIA 
Having already fought three wars and more than once 
having flirted with a fourth, India and Pakistan are often viewed 
as two states most likely to wage a nuclear war. This may be an 
exaggeration. The risk of nuclear conflict in South Asia is sig-
nificant, but it can be controlled with the effective application of 
arms control to stabilize nuclear deterrence between India and 
Pakistan. 
The US and Russia regulated the dangers of their global 
nuclear rivalry through a series of unilateral actions, reciprocal 
measures, and formally negotiated agreements to establish stable 
political and military relations. This nuclear arms process took 
place over several decades. It is not surprising that India and 
Pakistan have been slow to develop a stable nuclear order in 
South Asia. In response to recent military crises and the explo-
sion of nuclear devices by each state, Indian and Pakistani lead-
ers have learned to conduct military operations more cautiously 
(they have concluded several confidence-building measures 
[CBMs] on issues of marginal domestic and military impor-
tance), but they do not yet accept arms control as a way to en-
hance military security and stabilize strained political relations. 
With both states engaged in costly defense preparations, fears of 
demonstrate its missile capabilities to potential purchasers or, conversely, to raise the 
"price" it would cost the US to curb the North Korean missile program. 
VOL. 28 2000 
60 DOMIN 
surprise attack, military escalation, and even nuclear conflict 
loom over the subcontinent. 
Although fashioned first to stabilize competition be-
tween the superpowers, nuclear arms control is now suitable for 
South Asia. Arms control and CBMs can help India and Pakistan 
avoid a war that neither side wants, minimize the costs and risks 
of their arms competition, and curtail the scope and violence of 
conflict should it recur in South Asia.5 Regional arms control is 
important because each side engages in coercive strategic be-
havior-provocative troop movements and military exercise near 
tense borders, alleged support for militant groups in unstable 
regions of the other state, and recent cross-border firing along 
the line of control in Kashmir (the de-facto India-Pakistan bor-
der)-and yet both governments know they cannot afford esca-
lation to full-scale combat, much less nuclear conflict. Here I 
analyze the opportunities, incentives, and obstacles for a specific 
set of concepts and practices created by the superpowers during 
the Cold War to operate in the strategic and cultural context of 
contemporary South Asia. 
Neither India nor Pakistan has openly manufactured nu-
clear forces, but both states have a nuclear weapons program and 
could, on short notice, assemble and use such weapons. India has 
a large quantity of bomb-grade plutonium, and few doubt the 
ability of the Indian scientific community to make nuclear weap-
ons following the country's 1974 "peaceful nuclear experiment" 
and the 1998 underground tests. On the other side of the border, 
Pakistan's enrichment plant at Kahuta is believed to have pro-
duced enough weapons-grade uranium for several nuclear de-
vices as evidenced by its 1998 underground tests approximately 
two weeks after India's. Because of concerns about ongoing 
5These are the three arms control goals that Thomas C. Schelling and Morton H. Halperin 
identified in Strategy and Arms Control (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 196 I), I. 
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Pakistani efforts to develop these weapons, the US government 
ended all economic and military assistance to Pakistan in Octo-
ber 1990; the cancellation remains in effect today. Pakistan and 
India each have aircraft capable of delivering nuclear weapons to 
targets inside each other 's territory; and both states are develop-
ing, or seeking to obtain, ballistic missiles that may also be able 
to deliver nuclear warheads . 
Several CBMs have been proposed for both India and 
Pakistan : a regional cutoff of fissile material production , a re-
gional nuclear test ban, safeguards on new and existing nuclear 
facilities, extension of the no-attack pledge to cover population 
centers, enhanced international security assurances , regional risk 
reduction centers, upgraded hotlines between military and politi-
cal officials, and regular exchanges of military personnel. How-
ever, even the best ideas cannot succeed in the absence of a sta-
ble arms control culture . 
Effective and durable arms control requires India, Paki-
stan, and the US-the only outside power capable of facilitating 
regional arms control presently-to develop the guidelines and 
attitudes required for nuclear stability . Five obstacles impede 
efforts to establish this culture in South Asia: (I) the diplomatic 
preoccupation with nuclear disarmament to the detriment of 
modest but yet feasible nuclear restraint measures ; (2) reluctance 
to aclmowledge the military purposes of Indian and Pakistani 
nuclear programs , preventing a realistic debate about reasonable 
limits on nuclear forces and strategies ; (3) an unwillingness of 
either side to pursue arms control as a vital source of national 
security; (4) an inability to transform the India-Pakistan strategic 
dialogue from tacit to explicit bargaining; and (5) the persistence 
of resentment and defiance among India, Pakistan , and the US. 
These obstacles are examined below. 
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THE PROBLEMS OF NUCLEAR DIPLOMACY IN SOUTH ASIA 
A major barrier to new thinking about nuclear deterrence 
and arms control in the region is the persistence of the long-
espoused ideas of disarmament and denuclearization among the 
three key actors involved: India, Pakistan, and the US. Tradi-
tional diplomatic measures on regional nuclear issues are firmly 
entrenched in the foreign policy bureaucracies of each state . 
Continued calls for the elimination of nuclear arms at the global 
level by India and regionally by Pakistan and the US inhibit new 
thinking about arms control. There are postures for change in the 
region ( experts in all three states argue for regional arms control 
over disarmament) but this new thinking does not yet enjoy wide 
support among policy elites. 
India has long been an outspoken opponent of nuclear 
deterrence and arms control. Even before independence , Jawa-
harlal Nehru campaigned to ban nuclear weapons. Like Mahatma 
Gandhi , Nehru argued that nuclear violence could not be coun-
tered by threats of nuclear retaliation; this would spell the utter 
destruction of humanity. Every Indian prime minister since has 
viewed deterrence as immoral and as an irrational basis for na-
tional security in the nuclear age. This opinion was expressed 
clearly in the Delhi Declaration of Rajiv Gandhi and Mikhail 
Gorbachev in 1986 and in India's 1988 Action Plan on nuclear 
disarmament. In welcoming the 1993 START II agreement, India 
urged the "nuclear weapon states to re-examine doctrines on nu-
clear deterrence which have been used by them in (the) past to 
justify expansion of their nuclear arsenals." (Indian Press State-
ment) . 
India makes a sharp distinction between disarmament 
and arms control, rejecting the latter as an incomplete and diver-
sionary response to the nuclear danger. Largely ritualistic from 
the 1940s through the 1970s, India's support of nuclear disar-
mament grew stronger in the 1980s. Despite mounting evidence 
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of Pakistan's efforts to acquire a nuclear device in that decade, 
the procession of political benefits Pakistan gained through its 
espousal of regional denuclearization, mounting global pressures 
on India to embrace regional arms restraint, and increased do-
mestic pressure for India to declare itself as a nuclear weapon 
state, India still advocated global nuclear disarmament. This 
policy remains intact even as world attention has shifted from 
East-West arms control to regional nonproliferation. Having long 
viewed horizontal proliferation (rise in the number if nuclear-
armed states) and vertical proliferation (expansion of moderni-
zation of existing nuclear arsenals) as two sides of the same coin, 
India is more outspoken about the latter and insists that both 
problems must be solved simultaneously. Stressing the impor-
tance of equity in global nonproliferation efforts, Indian officials 
still see the global elimination of nuclear forces as the only fair 
and effective way to curb the spread of nuclear capabilities. 
Popular support for this policy, the bureaucracy 's resistance to 
rethink it, and the reluctance of political leaders to revise it are 
three factors that sustain India's disarmament diplomacy. 
As India stresses global denuclearization, the idea of re-
gional disarmament preoccupies Pakistan. Pakistan did not par-
ticipate actively in the global debates on nuclear arms during the 
1950s. When Pakistan became alarmed concerning India's nu-
clear potential in the 1960s, however, Pakistan initiated a cam-
paign to draw international attention to the military implications 
of India's civil nuclear program and to raise diplomatic costs to 
India of developing nuclear arms. Although policy means have 
changed over time, these aims still guide Pakistan 's nuclear di-
plomacy. 
During the 1960s and 1970s, Pakistan sought to prevent 
India from going nuclear by encouraging international measures 
to stop the spread of military nuclear capabilities to all nonnu-
clear weapon states. Pakistan was an early supporter of a nuclear 
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Nawaz Sharif added another proposal in 1991 when he called for 
five powers (the US, Russia, China, India, and Pakistan) to dis-
cuss the nuclear issue in South Asia. India has rejected all of 
these regional nuclear disannament proposals. 
THE US POSITION 
As part of its global nonproliferation policy, the US 
presently advocates nuclear disarmament for India and Pakistan. 
US efforts to curb the bomb's spread rest on the premise that 
new nuclear forces are inherently dangerous. While nonprolif-
eration has been a steady goal, the US has changed its strategy 
for controlling the bomb's spread globally and in South Asia 
(Lavoy 1991, p735-783). Breaking with early US efforts to pres-
sure India and Pakistan to join the NPT, the Clinton administra-
tion has urged these nuclear holdouts first to cap, then over time 
to reduce, and finally to eliminate their nuclear arms capabilities. 
In pursuit of this policy, the US stresses nonproliferation in bilat-
eral discussions with India and Pakistan; it urges them to stop 
producing fissile material for weapons purposes; it withholds 
economic and military aid from Pakistan until nonproliferation is 
verified; it supports high-level Indo-Pakistani talks on regional 
security and nonproliferation; it presses China not to aid Paki-
stan's nuclear missile efforts; and it engages other states, par-
ticularly Russia, France, Germany, and Japan, to hold bilateral 
nonproliferation discussions with India and Pakistan. 
Through mid-1999, the US has little to show for its ef-
forts. Despite improved relations with both states, particularly 
after the 1995 visit of Prime Minister P.V. Rao to the US and the 
January 1996 visit to the region by then Secretary of Defense 
William Perry, tensions over the nuclear issue remain high be-
tween the US and the South Asian states especially in the wake 
of the underground nuclear tests conducted by both states in 
May/June, 1998. However, as US officials come to accept that 
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nonproliferation treaty; in 1962 President Mohammed Ayub 
Khan urged the world community to devise a "treaty to outlaw 
the further spread of nuclear weapons" (Rai 1979, 241). While 
acknowledging the need to control vertical proliferation, Paki-
stani diplomat Agha Shahi said that the top priority was to curb 
horizontal proliferation, a problem he saw as a greater security 
threat to nonnuclear weapon states, and insisted that "to tie the 
question of nonproliferation of nuclear weapons to other meas-
ures restricting the nuclear arms race only result in an impasse" 
(Documents on Disarmament 1967). In the end, Pakistan refused 
to sign the NPT because it was not binding on India, which re-
fused to sign, and because it contained no mechanism for assur-
ing the security of Pakistan and other nonnuclear weapon states. 
Shortly after the NPT failure, and less than a year after 
Pakistan 's loss in the 1971 war, Pakistan launched a two-track 
policy to match and contain India 's growing nuclear might. In 
early 1972, Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto secretly directed 
his top scientists to start work on a nuclear weapons program. 
Several months later Bhutto initiated the second track-a bid to 
obtain Indian denuclearization through a diplomatic campaign to 
rid south Asia of nuclear weapons. Originally announced at the 
unveiling of a Pakistani nuclear reactor in late 1972, a South 
Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone plan was submitted by Pakistan 
to the UN in November 1974, six months after India's first nu-
clear test. 
Pakistan continued to pursue each policy track in the 
1980. As part of his diplomatic offensive against India, General 
Zia ul-Haq opposed six measures for regional disarmament: 
mutual renunciation of nuclear arms; inspection of each side's 
nuclear facilities; simultaneous acceptance of IAEA full-scope 
safeguards; joint accession to the NPT; a bilateral nuclear test 
ban; and a multilateral conference under UN auspices on nuclear 
nonproliferation in South Asia (Naqvi 1994, 11). Prime Minister 
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nuclear disarmament may no longer be a feasible goal for this 
region, the US appears gradually to be pushing for India and 
Pakistan to practice arms control. Secretary William Cohen sug-
gested as much in a June 1997 speech: "I recognized that the 
nuclear ambitions of India and Pakistan flow from a dynamic 
that we are unlikely to be able to influence in the near term. We 
might be able to gain influence over the long haul, but only if in 
the meantime we can prevent the tension from flaring into an-
other conflict" (Defense News 1997). 
The US pragmatic line is now finding support in sur-
prising places. Conceding that nuclear disarmament is beyond 
reach globally and in South Asia, and convinced that current 
diplomatic approached are counter productive, a new group of 
Indian and Pakistani defense specialists back arms control as a 
means to enhance security and to avoid nuclear war. Indian 
military experts K. Subrahmanyam and General K. Sundarji ac-
cept the permanence of nuclear forces in the region and stress the 
need for India and Pakistan to learn to live peacefully in such an 
environment (Subrahmanyam 1992). Although the Indian gov-
ernment still pushes global nuclear disarmament and is not pre-
pared to act on the nuclear realist perspective, it is showing 
greater flexibility and pragmatism . After the military crisis over 
Kashmir, India embraced the concept of confidence-building 
with Pakistan; several CBMs were negotiated and implemented 
by the two sides over the next three years (i.e., a ban on flights 
within five kilometers of the line of control in Kashmir, pre-
notification of military exercises).6 In Pakistan, too, there are 
isolated signs of willingness to move beyond the traditional pol-
icy of regional denuclearization to stabilize regional security. For 
6For a thorough discussion of these measures , see Michael Krepon , Dominique M. 
McKoy, and Matthew C.J. Rudolph , eds ., A Handbook of Confidence-Building Measures 
for Regional Security, Handbook No. 1 (Washington, D.C.: Henry L. Stimson Center, 
1993). 
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example, retired general K.M. Arif has urged India and Pakistan 
to consider turning the region into a "nuclear safe zone (that is, a 
region where nuclear deterrence is stable)" (Arif 1996, 18). 
Neither India or Pakistan accepts this plan yet, but the tide is 
turning : officials in the US, India, and Pakistan now seriously 
consider various nuclear arms control proposals if they do not 
yet embrace them. 
THE PROBLEM OF NUCLEAR OPACITY 
The common reluctance of India and Pakistan to discuss 
openly their force capabilities and intentions poses two problems 
for regional nuclear security. The first concerns the strategic in-
stability arising out of covert nuclear forces . The second problem 
is that nuclear opacity impedes Indian and Pakistani efforts to 
openly propose, negotiate, and accept nuclear arms control 
agreements. 7 This opacity leads policymakers to work out in pri-
vate measures that would be politically unpopular if publicized 
in either country. 
Strategic Stability 
Many experts believe that secrecy concerning nuclear 
capabilities, force employment doctrines, targeting plans , and 
escalation thresholds weakens deterrence and creates other po-
litical and military problems . Shai Feldman argues that covert 
nuclear weapons programs entail closed decision making without 
wider scrutiny, dominance of the military in the formulation of 
doctrine, biases toward offense and preemption, and strained cri-
sis management and nuclear signaling (Feldman 1992, 11). Gen-
' Nuclear opacity is a term used to describe the nuclear policies of India, Pakistan , Israel, 
and possibly other emerging nuclear states . Opaque nuclear states deny possession of 
nuclear warheads, do not make direct nuclear threats, do not deploy nuclear weapons, and 
do not openly debate nuclear plans. For further discussion see Avner Cohen and Benja-
min Frankel, Opaque Nuclear Proliferation , (London : Frank Cass, I 99 I), 14-44. 
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eral Sundarji sees two strategic problems of nuclear opacity for 
South Asia: the possibility of a war between India and Pakistan 
triggered through miscalculation of each other 's nuclear status 
and ignorance of each other 's nuclear doctrines; the difficulties 
ensuring the safety of nuclear warheads and the prevention of 
their unauthorized use in a clandestine state (Sundarji 1997, 19). 
On the other hand, nuclear opacity probably is required 
to preserve non-weaponized deterrence between India and Paki-
stan. George Perkovich and others contend that a condition of 
mutual deterrence deriving from the power of India and Pakistan 
to assemble nuclear arms quickly can be a steady source of re-
gional security (Pekovich 1993, 23). These analysts recognize, 
however, that the stability of non-weaponized deterrence requires 
India and Pakistan to undertake a demanding set of CBMs to 
assure each other and the international community that they have 
not built weapons and that they seek a situation of mutual secu-
rity. 
Arms Control 
In South Asia, nuclear arms have a meaning that extends 
well beyond their value as military and strategic bargaining in-
struments . Large portions of the region's informed population 
see civilian and military nuclear programs as components of, and 
indeed symbols for, national sovereignty and security. Thus, it is 
difficult for Indian and Pakistani officials to make public conces-
sions on nuclear issues. If India and Pakistan move to embrace 
nuclear arms control, it will be difficult for them to cultivate 
popular support for measures that very few citizens understand 
because of years of government secrecy. Obscure nuclear prolif-
eration in South Asia may have constrained a regional arms race 
and provided military policymakers flexibility in negotiations, 
but it has done so at the cost of preventing Indian and Pakistani 
leaders from cultivating domestic constituencies for nuclear arms 
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control and from identifying the precise nuclear security prob-
lems that are in the most need of control. 
PRESENT TREATIES, AGREEMENTS, AND LIMITATIONS 
Neither India nor Pakistan has accepted limits on mili-
tary activities that either state realistically might wish to pursue 
at some point in the future. Past and present Indo-Pakistani trea-
ties and CBMs have helped to reduce tensions and resolve trou-
blesome disputes but have not significantly altered the sources of 
military rivalry, stabilized nuclear security, nor seriously con-
strained the strategic behavior of either state.8 Arms control does 
not yet play a central role in South Asian military and nuclear 
affairs. 
Even in light of their recent underground detonations, 
India and Pakistan concluded their most consequential military 
pacts after their three wars. The costs of conflict forced them to 
negotiate measures for troop disengagement's and to make minor 
territorial adjustments along disputed borders; but neither side 
treated these settlements as conclusive since they did not solve 
basic problems-especially those underlying the Kashmir dis-
pute (Makeig 1997, 272). 
India and Pakistan jointly observe several military 
CBMs. Driven to avoid another violent conflict in the aftermath 
1The simmering Kashmir dispute, the cause of two previous wars between India and 
Pakistan, shot to international prominence in 1998 after both states detonated under-
ground nuclear devices and declared themselves nuclear powers. While there have been 
many CB Ms between these two states over the past decade, as of this writing, both Paki-
stan and India were warning of war six weeks into a bloody offensive to secure a vital 
highway in Kashmir from guerrillas (these guerrillas are believed to be a combination of 
Afghan mercenaries and Pakistan Army regulars who have occupied an 88-mile stretch of 
the snow-capped peaks and ridges shooting anything that moved on the highway) in the 
towering Himalayan heights . However , it would appear that the heavily armed guerrillas 
have been pushed back closer to the military Line of Control dividing India and Pakistan, 
allowing both sides to breath a sigh of relief. 
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of the Second India-Pakistan war, the two states agreed in 1966 
to provide prior notification of border exercises. In 1982, they 
established the Indo-Pakistan Joint Commission. Designed to 
facilitate normal relations between the two states by creating a 
forum for bilateral cooperation in communications, consular af-
fairs, cultural exchanges, trade, smuggling, and, more recently, 
drug trafficking, the commission convened several formal ses-
sions at the foreign minister level and more sessions at lower 
levels. 
As separatist violence in Indian-held Kashmir acceler-
ated in 1990, Indian and Pakistani troops fought armed skir-
mishes along the line of control. The heightened risk of a fourth 
Indian-Pakistan war quickly focused government attention in 
India and Pakistan , and even more so in the US, on the need for 
military CBMs. After a year of little progress , the foreign secre-
taries of India and Pakistan met in New Delhi in April 1991 and 
signed two major agreements, one pledging nonviolation by 
military aircraft of each other 's airspace and the other requiring 
each state to provide advance information about any military 
exercises and troop movements along common borders . India 
and Pakistan subsequently established a formal line of communi-
cation (hotline) between their military commanders and there is a 
new bus line linking the two states making travel between them 
much easier. 
Despite this impressive paperwork, few regional CBMs 
operate according to plan. Both states violate no-fly zones for 
combat aircraft and helicopters to map terrain across the border. 
Each state's underground nuclear tests has violated the agree-
ment on prior notification of military exercises. Abuses of the 
military hotline are also reported: after opening fire and inflict-
ing casualties on enemy troops in Kashmir and on the Siachin 
glacier the attacking party can call the enemy on the hotline to 
prevent hostilities from widening. Military and civilian officials 
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in the region remain skeptical of arms control as a means to en-
hance national security. 
The track record of CBMs in South Asia is spotty, at 
best. Both India and Pakistan assert that trust is lacking and is 
the key ingredient to improved relations, but neither state has 
chosen to generate trust through CBMs voluntarily negotiated. 
Now that nuclear dangers and regional instabilities have grown, 
India and Pakistan might do well to implement existing CBMs 
properly. New nuclear risk reduction measures might also be 
considered in bilateral negotiations. Will India and Pakistan now 
take CBM implementation more seriously than in the past? One 
clear indication will be whether both states again dwell on rhe-
torical initiatives designed for public relation purposes or move 
instead to negotiate concrete measures to reduce nuclear dangers. 
BARGAINING 
In the 1980s India and Pakistan enjoyed strong political 
leaders who had sufficient maneuvering room at home and the 
confidence needed to engage the other side and to de-escalate 
crises. It is not obvious that the tacit bargaining that worked well 
in the 1980s can be managed as effectively in the present era. 
Religious revivalist outbursts, spy scandals, feverish nationalism, 
communal rioting and bombings, and recent low-intensity con-
flict in Kashmir have disrupted the political dialogue. The trans-
formation of domestic politics in each state, marked by the rise 
of the religious right and the erosion of national leadership, 
makes it necessary to formalize arms control negotiations. 
The effectiveness of tacit bargaining depends on the cur-
rent state of relations between India and Pakistan and on the 
strength of each side's political leaders. Unfortunately, India and 
Pakistan have had weak and unstable governments for several 
years and there are no signs that political conditions are improv-
ing in either state. In response to a July 1998 call for bilateral 
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tension-reducing talks by Pakistan 's foreign minister, for exam-
ple, Indian foreign minister Salman Khursheed stated: "India 
wants to ease these tensions, but there is a period of uncertainty 
in Pakistan . For the present let us wait and watch" (Nation 1997, 
29). This attitude remains . Unilateral restraint and tacit CBMs 
are important in any adversarial relationship, especially when the 
threat of nuclear war is involved; but arms control must be for-
mally negotiated and ratified if it is to gamer widespread domes-
tic support and survive sudden changes in political leadership , 
popular sentiment, and international events. 
INDIA, PAKISTAN, AND THE US: 
UNDERSTANDING AND RECIPROCITY 
The final barrier to creating a viable arms control regime 
in South Asia is the prevalence of resentment and defiance 
among India, Pakistan, and the US. Specific conflicts have con-
founded amicable relations among these states, but, more im-
portant , each state often acts with moralism and sometimes hy-
pocrisy. The lack of trust and understanding between India and 
Pakistan is well known; neither side is willing to initiate a rela-
tionship of reciprocated good gestures. The animosity created by 
differences over the nuclear issue between the US and India and 
Pakistan is also destructive. US nonproliferation pressure inhibits 
open discussions between India and Pakistan on regional nuclear 
security. Pakistanis resent the imposition of the 1985 Pressler 
amendment (US legislation banning economic and military aid to 
Pakistan because of Pakistan 's nuclear weapons activities) , 
which they see as discriminatory and Indians object as strongly 
to US pressure on New Delhi to join the NPT and curb space and 
missile activities. Consequently, much Indian and Pakistani dip-
lomatic energy goes to diverting US pressure rather than thinking 
about and proposing creative ideas to promote regional nuclear 
security. 
THE JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 
soum ASIAN NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION 73 
At a deeper psychological level, the sense of US and 
collective Western pressure on nonproliferation perpetuates anti-
Western feelings. Such sentiments could produce a situation far 
more serious than that created by the "nuclear nationalism" that 
presently exists in India and Pakistan. Despite fragmentation of 
the domestic fabric in both states, the defense of national sover-
eignty, which the nuclear program symbolize, is a strong rallying 
cry. In a colonial region that has a long history of anti-Western 
populism, the US strategy of technology denial and punitive ac-
tions has the potential to trigger a new round of anti-Western 
activism. 
CONCLUSION: 
TOWARD A NEW NONPROLIFERATION STRATEGY 
The current erosion of the nonproliferation regime and a 
lack of any real arms control measures should not be too sur-
prising . The challenge now facing organizations and states 
working toward nonproliferation and arms control objectives is 
to recast those objectives to fit the post-Cold War era. The new 
characteristics of this era include a disaggregation of the Cold 
War 's bipolar organization of world politics , the resulting greater 
complexity and ambiguity of international relationships, and 
hence the increasing relevance of less obvious links among dis-
parate regions and circumstances. The bottom line is that prolif-
eration problems can no longer (if they ever could) be treated in 
isolation from one another. The problem of proliferation is better 
understood and treated in an integrated and holistic manner. 
Accordingly, states and non-governmental organizations 
seeking to promote arms control and nonproliferation need to 
begin with a strategy that recognizes the importance of links 
among discrete proliferation problems. This strategy would en-
tail seeking to identify those links when fashioning solutions, 
and therefore would require active and multifaceted interaction, 
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incorporating positive as well as negative inducements. Adopting 
such a strategy, which might best be called comprehensive en-
gagement, would be a first step toward generating a nonprolif-
eration regime strong enough-and inclusive enough-to over-
come current incentives for proliferation . 
For states in general, and for the US in particular, a strat-
egy of comprehensive engagement would go beyond the tactics 
of selective engagement manifested in recent years, by fully em-
bracing each of five elements. First, comprehensive engagement 
must continue to involve bilateral engagement on a state-by-state 
basis. This is the current US policy premise towards North Ko-
rea, and no other policy premise holds more promise despite the 
ruling regime 's inscrutability and recalcitrance. Shutting off cur-
rent contacts would only encourage this "isolated" regime to bol-
ster its existing contacts with other proliferation aspirants, such 
as Iran and Pakistan. Indeed, simply the prospect that existing 
punitive policies will be ended offers incentives for regimes, 
such as that in North Korea, to respond positively to direct en-
gagement (one source of the recent decline in US-DPRK rela-
tions is in fact a growing conviction among North Korean lead-
ers that there exists no real prospect of ending current US eco-
nomic sanctions) . However, even in such bilateral contexts, there 
is room for more integrated approached treating bilateral rela-
tionships in their entireties and focusing on the linkages between 
different issues within those relationships . 
Second, comprehensive engagement means sustaining 
requisite levels of attention and commitment to engagement over 
time. Too often, the US focuses on a proliferation problem only 
at moments of crisis. The specific efforts to engage North Korea 
in 1993-94 and India today-while laudable under the circum-
stances--<lemonstrate this tendency. Moreover, in allowing itself 
to gamer a reputation for addressing problems only when they 
become crises, the US risks encouraging states, or even non-
THE JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 
SOUTH ASIAN NUCLEAR PROUFERA TION 75 
governmental actors, to create crises by taking provocative ac-
tion in order to be regarded "seriously" by US policy makers. 
Such thinking may have been an underlying factor in India's de-
cision to go forward with its nuclear testing, and is likely a key 
source of the current crisis between the US and North Korea. 
The US cannot hope to sustain a consistent and successful non-
proliferation policy if each abated crisis is followed by waning 
attentions and flagging efforts, which only sow the seeds of a 
new crisis. 
Third, comprehensive engagement requires a conception 
of involvement with a region as a dynamic system, not simply 
with each of the states within it. In particular, the US has too of-
ten neglected the long-term systemic implications of seemingly 
prudent short-term tactics, thereby directly contributing to the 
type of regional proliferation it ostensibly opposes. For example, 
the Chinese M-11 sale to Pakistan followed shortly the US sale 
of F-16 fighters to Taiwan, which China saw as a direct violation 
of the US pledge to limit transfers of military weaponry to Tai-
wan. 9 To the extent that the F-16 sale to Taiwan undermined US 
credibility in persuading China to limit its own arms transfers in 
the region, the sale may have indirectly contributed to South 
Asian missile proliferation. At a broader level, this US tendency 
to ignore longer-term regional consequences of shorter-term, 
bilaterally-focused decisions has contributed to creating the pe-
culiar situation in which both India and China perceive the US to 
be tacitly and/or surreptitiously tilting in support toward the 
other. 10 The US will be unable to achieve nonproliferation gener-
91n the 1982 joint communique with China, the US agreed not to increase weapons sales 
to Taiwan "either in qualitative or in quantitative terms" beyond the levels of preceding 
years, and to reduce over time. 
10A!though the circumstance is likely most symptomatic of the level of distrust and suspi-
ciousness characterizing India-China relations , working to overcome these perceptions 
will be an important determinant of US effectiveness in acting as an agent of nondis-
criminatory norms in Asia. 
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ally until it can more effectively anticipate such long-term sys-
temic consequences into its short-term decision making . 
Fourth, comprehensive engagement must mean that the 
US and other nuclear weapon states seeking nonproliferation 
recognize more clearly how their own lack of progress toward 
nuclear arms control increases pressures for nuclear acquisition. 
Despite their commitment to the goal of vertical disarmament in 
the NPT, nuclear arms control negotiations between the US and 
the Soviet Union only achieved a brief period of respite in the 
two superpowers' nuclear arms race. Occasionally, as in the 
SALT I Treaty 's incentives to develop MIRV missile technolo-
gies, they even redirected that race in new and more dangerous 
directions. After important early progress, the slowing pace of 
the START process falls short of the arms control promises of-
fered by the US in negotiations for an indefinite extension of the 
NPT in 1995. The growing disregard of this promise by nuclear 
weapon states now threatens to undermine preparations for the 
next review of the NPT in 2000. 11 At the same time, US pro-
grams for sub-critical nuclear testing and continuing weapons 
"stewardship" effectively obviate much of the spirit, if not the 
letter, of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Thus, India does 
have a point, if not justification, in emphasizing years of unful-
filled promises for progress toward disarmament by nuclear-
armed states as motivations for its own nuclear program. Indeed, 
this relation between "vertical" and "horizontal" proliferation is 
one of the essential linkages of the proliferation network. The 
US and other nuclear-armed states cannot expect their condem-
11The breakdown and failure of the second Preparatory Committee meeting for the 2000 
Review Conference , held April 27 to May 8, 1998, was in good measure due to the wide-
spread perception that the nuclear weapons states (particularly the US and Russia) were 
attempting to rollback the commitments to disarmament included the decisions underly-
ing the 1995 indefinite extens ion of the NPT . 
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nation oflndia 's actions to be credible in the absence of recogni-
tion of this linkage. 
Finally, comprehensive engagement means developing 
an appreciation for the political context of proliferation. During 
the Cold War, a popular tendency developed to regard nuclear 
weapons issues as independent of politics. Ironically, nuclear 
strategists and nuclear abolitionists shared this perception : the 
former holding that nuclear weapons impose a logic of their 
own, bestowing a certain universality to theories of deterrence 
and war-fighting; the latter in holding that the sheer horror of 
nuclear war renders use of nuclear weapons "unthinkable." The 
end of the Cold War itself repudiates this notion. Despite force 
levels and launching capabilities that are as lethal as ever, the 
perceived nuclear war between the US and Russia has been dra-
matically reduced. The source of this reduced threat of war is the 
improvement in political relations between these states, which 
has decreased the animosities and uncertainties that have always 
lurked behind the abstract veneer of strategic theory. Improved 
political relations , not strategy, moved the superpowers toward 
greater actual peace. The lesson for South Asia is clear: only suf-
ficiently thorough and enduring improvements in the political 
climate (such as the hotline, the new busline, etc.) can reduce 
intrinsic temptations to proliferate, thus offering hope of achiev-
ing nonproliferation goals in the long term. Neither the spread of 
nuclear weapons, nor the prevention of that spread through puni-
tive sanctions or coercive counter-proliferation , is likely to help 
produce that peace . 
The proliferation problem in Asia today has many 
sources, of which the shortcomings of US nonproliferation pol-
icy constitute only one. However, the US, now the world's sole 
superpower and likely to remain so for quite some time to come, 
has an assurance of its own basic security needs and hence a 
latitude of behavior far exceeding that of any other nation . The 
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long shadow that its own nuclear weapons attitudes and policies 
cast over those of all other governments provides the US with a 
unique capacity to lead by example on nuclear weapons issues. 
This offers the US an unprecedented opportunity to articulate 
and pursue a long-term vision for national and global security in 
which the threats to use nuclear weapons is dramatically reduced 
or even eliminated . 
Whether or not the US is able to take the lead in building 
regional and global security regimes that rely less on threats to 
use nuclear weapons , this nevertheless must remain the essential 
goal of nonproliferation advocates . During the Cold War 's long 
nuclear stalemate, the argument arose that mutual nuclear deter-
rence was in fact a force for peace, strongly discouraging actual 
war between the superpowers. Such perceptions endure; indeed, 
one of the most intractable features of the proliferation problem 
is that not all agree even that proliferation is a problem . Clearly 
this was not the view of the great majority of Indian and Paki-
stani citizens who favored their countries ' acquisition of de-
ployed nuclear capabilities--even as many of them also antici-
pated the eventual use of these weapons. 
This notion is an illusion: the psychological vulnerability 
and political tension engendered by mutual assured destruction 
provided genuine security to no state. While the threat of nuclear 
destruction may have helped to stave off overt military conflict 
among nuclear-armed states, nuclear deterrence did nothing to 
promote the resolution of the political conflicts fueling the rival-
ries of these states. The improved conditions of major power re-
lations in the wake of the Cold War, however limited they re-
main, reveal starkly the paucity of the "security" provided to the 
superpowers by their nuclear weapons during the Cold War it-
self. Progress toward a genuine nuclear disarmament, in all its 
facets, depends upon debunking the illusion of "nuclear peace" 
wherever it emerges, and building security regimes that would 
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aim ultimately at replacing persistent dependence on nuclear de-
terrence. 
The predominant justification for India's and Pakistan's 
nuclear tests, drawing as they do on Cold War conceptions of the 
political utility of nuclear weapons and other technologies of 
weapons of mass destruction, represent a dramatic turn away 
from this realization . India and Pakistan certainly perceive them-
selves as pursuing legitimate security interests and in fact be-
having no differently than did the US and the Soviet Union 
throughout the Cold War. Indeed, many of the US' own nuclear 
policies and practices also still derive from such calculations. 
However, emulation is not validation. In a nuclear-armed South 
Asia, India will depend for its security-as it never has before-
on the prudence, competence, and authority of decision makers 
in Pakistan (just as the US, as much today as during the Cold 
War, relied upon command and control coherence in Russia). For 
its part , in addition to a similar security dependence upon India, 
Pakistan will labor under crushing economic and political bur-
dens to maintain not only its "nuclear deterrent" but also its very 
integrity as a state. Meanwhile, for citizens of Bangladesh, Sri 
Lanka, and other neighboring states, the world today is an ir-
revocably more dangerous place. 
The US has already accomplished much to lay the foun-
dations for stricter controls on and dramatic reductions in nuclear 
weapons worldwide. However, the US and other nuclear powers 
need to do more to maintain regional stability in South Asia. The 
world looks to the US, as the sole remaining superpower, for 
leadership. However, paradoxically, it is mainly the US' attitude, 
not India's or Pakistan 's, that ensures the continuing legitimacy 
of nuclear weapons . The US, and the other declared nuclear 
weapon states, should stop preaching nuclear chastity until they, 
too, are willing to forswear nuclear weapons. The dictum, "do as 
we say, not as we do" is hypocritical; great powers lead by ex-
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ample, not by empty words (Hagerty 1998, 195-196). The 
agenda prescribed in this essay is ambitious and will not be ac-
complished quickly, but the time has come to intensify the effort 
to achieve it and finally lead by example. 
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